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the search in the principal case was more than incidental to the arrest.
The right to search after making an arrest is recognized for two rea-
sons: to search for concealed weapons and to search for pertinent
evidence which, if on the person of the arrestee, might be hidden or
destroyed by him. It is admitted that the right to search an arrestee
has gone beyond the limits which would be set if these two factors
were all that were involved in the problem.12 Even so, it is submitted
that this case goes too far. To be "incident to" an arrest, the search
should be contemporaneous with the arrest, as was pointed out in the
Lewis case. That portion of the Lewis rule apparently has been dis-
regarded here. It is to be regretted that the court did not spell out
exactly why it found the Lewis case inapplicable.
By way of summary, it is the opinion of the writer that the court
made a perfectly reasonable extension of the law of arrest without a
warrant by upholding the legality of the arrest in the instant case.
While not a direct accusation of guilt, the testimony on which the
arrest was based definitely afforded a reasonable belief that the de-
fendant had committed a felony.
It is also believed that the court has reached a just, workable,
logical solution to the problems which arise from the recognition of
the policeman-informer privilege. In permitting the trial court to rule
on the question of the reasonableness of the officer's belief that the
defendant had committed a felony, the court followed the well-estab-
lished Kentucky rule, which also appears to be the majority rule.13
The opinion's only weakness is in the court's failure to elaborate on its
conclusion that the search of the defendant's car was proper. More
analysis of the Lewis case and its relation to the case at bar would
have served to clarify the present court's position on the law of
search and seizure incidental to an arrest.
Tom SoYns
DivOHCE-CONDONATION As DmENSE To AcroN BAsED oN CRuELTY-
Plaintiff-wife brought action in the Fayette Circuit Court for divorce
on grounds of cruelty. The lower court found that the parties were,
made in his presence. Since this is surely not the law, it is believed that the court
intended to require that the search be both in the presence of the arrestee and
incident to the arest.
" The best-known American case on the subject is U.S. v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 70 S. Ct. 480, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950). Other cases on the same subject
are collected and annotated at 32 A.L.R. 697 (1924); 51 A.L.R. 434 (1927); 74
A.L.R. 1394 (1931); 82 A.L.R. 786 (1933). A group of typical Kentucky cases
can be found at 51 A.L.R. 434 (1927). "Supra, note 8.
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at the time of the action, living together with their two children in a
three room apartment. The plaintiff was sleeping on a couch in the
living room and the defendant was sleeping in the bedroom. Testi-
mony of the children established that the parties had not been en-
gaging in sexual intercourse. The lower court dismissed the complaint.
Held: Judgment reversed. York v. York, 280 S.W. 2d 553 (Ky. 1955).
To constitute grounds for divorce for cruelty the Kentucky statutes
require cruel and inhuman treatment extending over a period of not
less than six months.' Thus, the theory upon which the lower court
dismissed the complaint in the principal case would seem to have
been that as soon as the statutory ground arises, or at least soon
thereafter, the injured party must take up a separate residence or he
will be barred from asserting such ground because it has been con-
doned. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in reversing the lower court,
said:
In cases of continuing offense-such as cruel treatment ...
condonation will not be implied from either living together or acts of
coition....
A spouse's endurance of cruelty and indignities in hope
that the other will change has as much the character of probation
as of condonation, and the continuation of all marital relations will
raise no presumption against the true facts.2
Obviously the theory of the lower court as to the facts necessary for
condonation was wrong and the reversal by the Court of Appeals on
the facts presented right. Mere cohabitation will not usually con-
stitute condonation.3 However, the importance of the case arises from
the dictum of the Court of Appeals quoted above. The question with
which this comment will deal is whether the court has, by dictum, too
severely limited condonation implied from conduct as a defense to a
divorce based on cruelty.
The principles of condonation have their origin in the canon law
of the Roman Catholic Church.4 Today only a few states have statutesu
concerning the nature and effect of condonation, and in other states
the basic principles are still those applied by the ecclesiastical courts,
with modem innovations to cope with new problems. The theory was
IKy. REv. STAT. sec. 403.020 (3)(b); sec. 403.020(4)(d) (1953).
'York v. York, 280 S.W. 2d 553, 556 (Ky. 1955). This case is also important,
by dictum, of the law of condonation as applied to other grounds for divorce in
Kentucky.
'Dennison v. Dennison, 189 Ark. 239, 71 S.W. 2d 1055 (1934); Morris v.
Morris, 202 Ga. 431, 43 S.E. 2d 639 (1947); Lowe v. Lowe, 229 S.W. 2d 7 (Mo.
App. 1950).
,Moss v. Moss, Prob. 155 (1916); Collins v. Collins, L.R. 9 App. Cas. 205
(1844).
'CAL. Civ. CoDE see. 111, 115-21 (Deering 1949); N.D. REv. CODE sec. 14-
0510, 14-0513 (1943).
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first applied in actions based on adultery, but in comparatively recent
times it has been applied extensively in cases involving cruelty and
similar offenses of a continuing nature.6
As to the application of condonation as a defense to a divorce
action based on cruelty, the text writers seem to take divergent views
as to what facts constitute condonation by implication. One leading
text writer says:
Condonation may also be implied from the conduct of the
parties, without proof of express forgiveness, and even, it seems from
some of the cases, though it could be shown that there was no for-
giveness in fact. Sexual intercourse, for instance, with knowledge of
a prior offense, is such condonation. Voluntary cohabitation, also,
is generally held to be proof of condonation; but condonation will not
necessarily be implied from the fact that the husband and wife con-
tinued to live together if there was no sexual intercourse, and if
there is not in fact intent to forgive.7
Thus, Professor Madden says that sexual intercourse is condonation
per se while cohabitation will at least raise an inference of condona-
tion. Madden's statement is valid as applied to adultery as a ground
for divorce and is supported by case authority which holds that sexual
intercourse with knowledge of the adultery may be condonation per
se.s The weakness in his position is in his failure to distinguish be-
tween adultery and the so-called continuing offenses such as cruelty in
regard to facts constituting condonation.
The majority and better rule as to condonation of cruelty by co-
habitation and sexual intercourse is well stated by Professor Keezer:
It has sometimes been said that the doctrine of condona-
tion arising from continued cohabitation was inapplicable to cases of
a libel by the wife seeking a divorce for extreme cruelty. But the bet-
ter established rule seems to be that cruelty, as well as adultery, may
be the subject of condonation, by continued cohabitation, but the
principle requires evidence of an unequivocal intent to forgive and to
voluntarily resume marital relations.9 (Emphasis supplied.)
The cases uniformily support Keezer by recognizing that there is a
distinction between the condonation of adultery and the condonation
of cruelty because of the differences in the character of the offenses.' 0
'Shirey v. Shirey, 87 Ark. 175, 112 S.W. 369 (1908); In Re Adams, 161
Iowa 88, 140 N.W. 872 (1913); Root v. Root, 164 Mich. 638, 130 N.W. 194
(1911); Johnsen v. Johnsen, 78 Wash. 423, 189 Pac. 189 (1914). Condonation
may arise in several ways, for instance, as a defense to a marital offense asserted
by one party as recriminatory and barring divorce. See Comment in 12 Ky. L.J.
169 (1924).
MADDEN, PEasoNs AND Dom-mc RELATIONs, 303 (1931).
'Tilton v. Tilton, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 538, 29 S.W. 290 (1895).
' KEEzEn, ON Tr. LAw OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 557-558 (3rd ed., More-
land 1945).
" Brown v. Brown, 171 Kan. 249, 232 P.2d 603 (1951); Ramsay v. Ramsay,
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The validity of this distinction becomes readily apparent when con-
sideration is given to the position of the parties when cruelty is alleged
as a basis for divorce.
As has been pointed out above, by statute cruelty may not be
alleged as a ground for divorce in Kentucky until the cruelty has been
endured for a period of six months. Thus, cohabitation and sexual
intercourse could not be condonation during this period," but what
of the effects of these acts following the initial period of cruelty? It is
the belief of this writer that cohabitation and sexual intercourse after
the six month period should not necessarily be condonation. It is cer-
tainly commendable for an injured spouse to continue cohabitation
with a spouse who is commiting a series of cruel acts where the injured
spouse has hopes that the other will mend his ways and the marriage
will be saved by a patient forbearance. Denying a divorce to an
injured spouse in these circumstances would certainly not be equitable.
The enduring by one spouse of the other's cruelties in the hope of re-
form has the character of probation rather than condonation.'2
When condonation because of cohabitation and sexual intercourse
is raised against the wife there is even stronger argument against strict
application of condonation. There are many circumstances in which it
would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for the wife to with-
draw from cohabitation. Frequently an injured wife has no financial
resources and no employment, and this deters her from leaving her hus-
band. Courts have generally given the wife leeway and hold that she
does not condone her husband's cruelty by remaining with him for a
reasonable time because of economic circumstances.' 3 The fact that
the wife continues the cohabitation for the sake of children is often a
fact of much importance in cases holding that a particular continuance
of cohabitation did not constitute condonation. 14 When a wife does
continue cohabitation in these circumstances, should the fact that she
also indulges in sexual intercourse call for a finding of condonation?
Probably not, for as the Kentucky Court of Appeals pointed out in
the principal case:
244 P.2d 381 (Nev. 1952); Fisher v. Fisher, 223 App. Div. 19, 227 N.Y.S. 345,
aff'd 250 N.Y. 313, 165 N.E. 460 (1928).
1 Meyer v. Meyer, 226 Ky. 278, 10 S.W. 2d 844 (1928).
'Wilson v. Wilson, 16 R.I. 122, 13 A.102 (1888).
" Brown v. Brown, 219 Ala. 104, 121 So. 386 (1929); Pichon v. Pichon, 164
La. 272, 113 So. 845 (1927).
1 4 Hansen v. Hansen, 86 Cal. App. 744, 261 P. 503 (1927); Rasgaitis v.
Rasgaitis, 347 Ill. App. 477, 107 N.E. 2d 273 (1952); Mack v. Handy, 39 La.
Ann. 491, 2 So. 181 (1887); Lowe v. Lowe, 229 S.W. 2d 7 (Mo. 1950).
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We do not believe it is cynical to suggest that complete
rapport is not always reached. It is not unbelievable that submis-
sion is bad as a convenient avoidance of imminent trouble.15
Thus, this writer is in full accord with the statement of law
enunciated by Keezer. Mere cohabitation and probable or actual
sexual intercourse following the accrual of the cause of action for
divorce based on cruelty should not result in condonation unless there
is an unequivocal intent to forgive and resume marital relations.
Kentucky has, by dictum in the principal case, seemingly placed itself
among the followers of this rule. Although not stating in affirmative
language what facts will constitute condonation of cruelty the Ken-
tucky court has stated negatively that, ". . condonation will not be
implied from either living together or acts of coition."1 6 (Emphasis
supplied). The ascertainable affirmative implication from this state-
ment would seem to be that no condonation will arise unless there is
proven an unequivocal intent to forgive. Thus Kentucky has not
made condonation as applied to cruelty too difficult of proof but has
merely declared itself a follower of the better rule.
J. MoNTjoy TnuvmLE
PRAcrCE AND PROCEDUPE-STATUTES OF LnLTATIONS-INTERPRETATION
OF SAVING CLAUSEs-Plaintiff, as ancillary administrator, brought suit
on May 4, 1958, in Oldham Circuit Court against defendant for negli-
gently killing plaintiff's decedent in an automobile accident on Feb.
12, 1951. Decedents domiciliary administrator, an Ohio resident, had
previously on July 12, 1951, brought a similar suit in Federal District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky, which had been dismissed
on the ground that the Ohio administrator could not maintain the
action in Kentucky. Plaintiff was then appointed ancillary administra-
tor, and brought suit in the federal District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Kentucky on January 20, 1952, less than a year after the ac-
cident, and thus before the statute of limitations had run. On April
28, 1952, this suit was dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction, the
District Court failing to find any diversity of citizenship since both the
plaintiff and the defendant were residents of Kentucky. This judg-
ment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals on Feb. 16,
1953.1 Relying upon Kentucky Revised Statutes 413.270,2 which pro-
" Supra note 2 at 555. 20 Id. at 556.
1 Ockerman v. Wise, 202 F. 2d 144 (6th Cir. 1953).
S"If an action is commenced in due time and in good faith in any court of
this state and the defendants or any of them make defense, and it is adjudged
